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Evil as Object of a Deliberate Action (Part 2):
A Christian Reassessment of the “Lesser Evil” Principle
Jakub RAJČÁNI
　 This article is a continuation of a two-part engagement with the concept of evil as it has been 
developed and (mis)interpreted in the history.  In the first part I traced the roots and the 
classical meaning of the axiom of a “lesser evil”.  I presented the insights of Pope Gregory the 
Great, of the Eighth Council of Toledo, and of Gratian which pertain to this topic, as well as the 
more or less implicit views of Aquinas on evil, on the object of action and on sinful yet non-
culpable actions performed in accordance with the conscience.  I have pointed out that this 
principle of lesser evil is not at all as simple as it might look, and that its original application was 
extremely limited.  There was also a shift in word usage ― from consentingly tolerating a lesser 
damage to engaging in choosing a lesser of (usually) two evils.  In what follows, I will focus on 
post-Renaissance thought and consider criticism oriented toward this lesser-evil-thought from 
the perspective of Catholic moral theology.  The numbering of the chapters follows the previous 
part.
3. Controversial points and modern hermeneutics
　 As it was mentioned above, one psychological difficulty, particularly for modern people, 
consists especially in being convinced that not avoiding any of the two concurring moral evils 
makes one feel or look responsible for its effect always and everywhere, almost as if there were 
an absolute duty to reduce suffering and to not tolerate any evil.  In fact, the person involved in 
many dilemmatic situations can and should be objectively considered a “third person”, “an 
observer” rather than subject of the evil action at stake.  Not doing anything, however, can and 
often does make one feel a subjective responsibility for an action that simply happened to occur. 
It is a particularly interesting fact connected to our problem, that in the moral thought of the 
Orthodox Church for example, one is held in some sense responsible even for physical evils 
into which the person got involved without any direct participation ― e.g., a spontaneous 
abortion, for which the woman concerned by it has to do a certain penance, although she is 
personally without an objective guilt.40 The idea is that an evil, in this case a physical one, is a 
pitiful and regrettable thing, notwithstanding it happened with or without anybody’s direct 
guilt, and therefore has to be repaired in some way by somebody.  Even an evil committed 
40 Cf. H. T. ENGELHARDT Jr., “Sins, Voluntary and Involuntary: Recognizing the Limits of Double Effect,” Christian Bioethics 
3 (1997), 173―180 and later works.
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involuntarily or unconsciously would be thought to foster the structures of evil in this world, 
and therefore has to be grieved and satisfied for.  This kind of logic, even though it may appear 
cruel because of inculpating a person who maybe was not even aware of the evil that was going 
to happen, offers an interesting point.  If a person cannot easily stay indifferent towards some 
physical (!) evil with which she is only accidentally involved ― may she be held responsible for 
it or not ―, then a fortiori nobody can stay calm in front of a moral evil that she is about to 
directly choose (even though it might be useful or supposed to bring about good effects as 
well).  The good effect must not be a by-product of evil actions but rather the contrary: good 
actions can, and in certain cases do have evil side effects.  An evil should be always something 
unfortunate and endured, tolerated and deplored, rather than directly willed and actively 
consented to.  Calling the decision for evil a “choice” is only an analogy to the real active choice 
of the good.
　 On the other hand, in recent history there have been even interpretations, according to 
which an evil that is only a by-product of an action directed towards another end would be 
better called “pre-moral”.41 In the opinion of these authors, in virtually any action humans 
(because of their contingency) cannot avoid committing some evil for which, however, they are 
not to be held responsible.  There are probably bad collateral effects we do not envisage, and 
an obsessive will to avoid every compromise with evil would thus mean avoiding many precious 
occasions to increase the good or, even worse, to act at all.  But are completely good actions 
really such an impossible task? Some people might indeed say that almost every human deed is 
compromised by some evil (collateral effects, foreseen or unforeseen bad consequences, 
imperfect intention, etc.) or that we cannot help but make compromises with evil while living in 
the present human condition.  Their goal might be to narrow the category of sin and thus ― by 
calling some (or in fact many) evils simply pre-moral or ontic ― to free people from 
condemnation and paralyzing remorse.  The supreme principle here would be the 
proportionality42 between good achieved and evil permitted (or rather actively allowed).  In this 
41 This is an essentially consequentialist or rather proportionalistic term, connected with names such as L. Janssens or R. 
McCormick. Put in simple words, pre-moral deeds can resemble evil and unfortunate actions but they lack the quality 
of being evil because of the not fully involved subject. The reason for it might be that the agent did not have other 
choice or that she had sufficient reasons for committing the otherwise non-desirable action. This idea of pre-moral acts 
has been clearly rejected by the Magisterium.
42 To quote just one example, “the good we do comes mixed with some bad. Our moral efforts are directed toward trying 
to achieve the greatest proportion of good to evil” (244), “all human actions contain some features which enhance our 
humanity and some features which restrict it. To the extent that these features enhance the potential for human 
goodness and growth, they are premoral or ontic goods. [... w]e are not able to realize all the values open to us in any 
one action without causing or tolerating some degree of premoral/ontic evil” (269). The references are to Richard M. 
GULA, Reason Informed by Faith. Foundations of Catholic Morality, Paulist Press: Mahwah ― New York, 1989, where the 
author aptly summarized positions of various representative proportionalists. Consider the next statements: 
“Premoral/ontic evil refers to the lack of perfection in anything whatsoever. [...] Since we will never get away from 
these features of our actions, we must learn to live in ways which will keep the premoral/ontic evil features to a 
minimum, even though we cannot completely eliminate them in all their form” (ibid.), “we can, and inevitably do, 
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view, if something good or morally required cannot be done with the best intention, it is 
sufficient that it be done unwillingly.  Or conversely, simply by not committing intrinsically 
wrong actions we are not to be called good yet.  But the real question is whether we are obliged 
or forced to achieve as much good as possible even at the cost of risking “proportionally lesser” 
or “ignorable” evils, for which obviously we would not be held directly responsible.  And 
further, to say that circumstances can mitigate the wrongness of some actions is, logically, not 
the same as to say that there are not any actions that ought not to be done, without guilt, for 
whatever good reason.  Where does this imperative to commit some evil, that otherwise would 
not be necessary, so as to achieve good come from? The only point to be agreed upon with 
certainty is that such impermissible actions should be exceptional and as few as possible.43 The 
notion of a proportionality between good and evil, however, is indicative of the fact that good 
and evil are in relation and have to be well balanced, almost as if they were some dualistic 
principles, resembling more a yin-yang conception of being.44 It is this point that is simply 
untenable.  Unlike justice and mercy that oftentimes go and should go hand in hand, good and 
evil do not form a bigger whole, nor do they contain each other partially.
　 A model case for measuring and comparing imperfect and unideal outcomes of actions are 
the so-called “trolley dilemmas” which, however, present many problems.45 In fact, apart from 
being at times unnecessarily intricate, they often compare only results of two incomparable 
actions of a different kind ― directly killing and letting-die although consciously.  They often do 
not distinguish between who is entitled to decide and to act upon the emergent danger and who 
is not.  From the personalistic perspective, can lives be simply numerically weighed? The 
language commonly used in such scenarios is the one of “sacrificing” one victim against her 
will for the good of other x people who otherwise would be doomed to die.  However, originally 
the language of sacrifice is a religious term and refers to offering to God something (precious) 
that belongs to the agent.46 In most cases the only life we can sacrifice, e.g., by foregoing the 
commit some premoral/ontic evil to achieve good. [...] The agent must be able to justify the risk of causing some 
undesirable effects in light of the undesirability of other options” (271).
43 As a matter of fact, “moral object” which solely can be good or bad is not only a “physical act,” and the late scholastic 
theology was sometimes defining it too narrowly, multiplying as a result cases that would come under that category (cf. 
S. PINCKAERS, “Historical Perspective on Intrinsically Evil Acts,” in The Pinckaers Reader. Renewing Thomistic Moral 
Theology, ed. J. Berkman ― C. S. Titus, The Catholic University of America Press: Washington D.C., 2005, 234).
44 See the fn. 19 in Part 1.
45 Apart from those problematics discussed below, I want to mention the “intuitionality” of these scenarios. The response 
to a dilemmatic situation changes over time, when people are given more time for reflecting upon, as well as depending 
on gender, age, etc. Hence, it is far from being possible to present them as model cases for behavior in other 
circumstances.
46 This thread of thought gets even more interesting if we consider the idea of Agamben, according to which a “sacred” 
human life can be perhaps killed in some circumstances but may never be sacrificed as an offering to gods. This is an 
immense paradox because it states that such lives are not worthy enough to be protected by the law, while at the same 
time they are more than animal and hence cannot be sacrificed. It sounds almost ironic to call them “sacred” just 
because they stand outside of the law.
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due self-protection, is first and foremost one’s own life, or the life of an aggressor while justly 
protecting the life of oneself or others entrusted to oneself.  The number of lives saved 
regardless the method applied or relationships involved can never be the only aspect that 
matters in this kind of dilemma.  It goes without saying that, living in a world radically marked 
by evil, sometimes it is indeed impossible to save any life or reduce the harm without offering 
something in exchange.  If the cost is not too high, it seems indeed that the possibility to 
reduce evil becomes a right and maybe even a duty.  But to assume that any evil (such as 
actively causing a death of a person that is not related to the case nor dependent on the agent) 
can be accepted and used for causing a greater good is rather similar to “playing God,” who 
admittedly in his mysterious wisdom and omnipotence does allow physical and moral evils ― for 
which he is not directly responsible ― to produce an even greater good.47
　 Although the above-mentioned scenario of the “trolley case” is usually accepted as a model 
situation for applying the “double effect” principle ― of which one condition is that lesser evil 
may be allowed only if the result is reasonably proportionate ― it does not leave me completely 
convinced.  The reasons for it are principally two: in my opinion, the person who commits the 
one action from which two results derive must be in some way involved (as in the classical case 
of self-defense) and not a mere bystander; 48 further, I find it hardly acceptable if the action is 
not spontaneous and instinctive (quasi neglecting or not even fully realizing the fact that by 
saving five lives one will have to sacrifice one) but premeditated instead.  It makes a difference 
whether one is redirecting the trajectory to a different track (compared to the original point of 
arrival) out of emergency or whether one is deciding to which route the train should be sent as 
a simple alternative.  Also calling it justifiable cannot mean that this way of behaving is a 
standard one nor is it a duty to follow universally, but it is rather an example and may be 
renounced.  Undoubtedly, even if the agent (driver or bystander) causes the death of one 
person in order to save (not to kill, not to let die?) more persons, he or she will not be held 
responsible or culpable.  But that is not to say that this course of action is always required or 
exemplar way for virtuous action.49 Be it as it may, in my view this “trolley dilemma” scenario 
47 The reason for this wanting to be like God or even godlier than God himself vary; it does not necessarily have to do 
with pride that mimics God here. Moreover, human beings cannot easily stand the presence of evil, thus giving witness 
to the longing for or perhaps nostalgia for the perfect paradisiac state. Nevertheless, imagining a utopian world without 
any involvement in evil can lead to frustration and resignation and, on the other hand, to cruel solutions which 
substitute people for God. Thus, playing God can have precisely two distinct forms: willingness to permit evil with 
some good insight, and intolerance for or attempt to prevent every evil altogether.
48 Notoriously, Judith J. Thomson changed her mind in respect to her original position and claims that while the driver is 
held to do something and possibly choose the less harmful action (since she supposes that not doing anything will 
mean the same as to kill the five people), the bystander must not get involved in the decision (because for her not to do 
anything will only mean to let those five people unfortunately die). From the vast array of bibliography, see: F. M. 
KAMM, The Trolley Problem Mysteries, ed. E. Rackowski, Oxford University Press: New York, 2019. Kamm expressed 
disagreement over Thomson’s position but her reasoning is far from being convincing.
49 It is quite interesting to mention at this point, that some experiments with artificial intelligence have surprisingly 
showed that even robots supposed to find optimal solutions and learn from human behavior would not prefer one death 
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leaves unresolved problems, and the spontaneous reaction of many people does not prove that 
everything gets resolved unproblematically only by choosing a lesser evil.  In the end, how 
should lives be compared, just numerically or does their essence matter as well? Saving five 
lives instead of one does not have to be a priori a greater good or at least not one that is always 
to be pursued at any cost.  Sometimes, what seems to be better prima facie does not need to be 
thus in the long run.  Would utilitarian and consequentialist proponents of this principle act 
according to the maximization principle, if it turned out that the one life which they were about 
to sacrifice was their mother? Or does the meaning of what is the “lesser” evil differ in every 
case and for every agent? Again, it seems more reasonable to affirm that evil should not be 
chosen only because it is lesser than some other.  In fact, if the evilness of every evil action 
consisted of the same thing, for instance, suffering, it would be easy to prefer better deeds. 
However, there are other aspects of wrongness in some actions than just lack of pleasure. 
Maybe the obvious reality that people cannot agree on why all evil actions are evil is a sort of 
indirect proof of why they should not be actively pursued.  The same holds true, in my view, for 
ethical criteria in technological research and experimentation: if a new technology does not 
represent a considerable threat nor a treatment proves dangerous except to a rationally 
accepted degree, this does not make either permissible, let alone worthy of pursuit.
　 It has been often the case that too many situations were subsumed under one principle, as in 
the case of calling “lesser” many evils of a different kind.  The question is whether we can 
compare scenarios both of which are evil, but of which one is actively pursued whereas the 
other is just let happen, or of which one is agreed upon in order to avoid a greater damage 
whereas other has as its goal achiev ing a bigger good.  The Christian tradition used to 
distinguish between “acting” (in the strict sense) and “permitting to happen,” and I have 
claimed that this distinction is valid.  Based on that, we can imagine at least four similar yet 
different scenarios:
A.1 An evil actively chosen in order that a (greater) good might follow;
A.2 An evil that is permitted in order that a (greater) good might follow;
B.1 An evil actively chosen so that a greater evil is avoided;
B.2 An evil that is permitted so that a greater evil is avoided.
We are leaving aside here the question whether the “in order/so that” part makes any 
particular difference, i.e., if it matters whether the second action is a consequence or a mere 
collateral effect, which in my opinion does.50 Of these four possible courses of action, B.2 is 
flawless although the result is and remains a regretful one.  Humans have some responsibility 
also towards evils that occurred without their contribution while they were aware of them.  The 
point is just that in this case nobody is considered personally guilty.  On the other hand, A.2 is 
of a person who does not need die (i.e. a murder) over stopping the death of five people as a result of a “natural course 
of action” who cannot be helped otherwise.
50 A result, good or bad, that simply follows the previous action is not the same as a result that is achieved through the 
preceding action.
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disputable but maybe it is logically and morally tenable, at least in cases in which physical evils 
are concerned, given that we can have (at least in certain cases) the noble obligation to pursue 
the greatest good possible.  On the contrary, A.1 contradicts the fundamental principle of the 
Christian ethics, mentioned earlier,51 according to which “the good end does not justify bad 
means” and is more akin to utilitarian reasoning.  It is easily refutable on the grounds that we 
do not have a duty to do good at any cost.  Finally, B.1 is in my view the most problematic one 
in this context.  Its goal is reduction of evil consequences, however involving oneself in 
evildoing when evil is to happen anyway seems to be an unnecessary if not unfortunate 
solution.52 The danger is to include various situations under the same label “lesser evil”.  In fact, 
anticipating the conclusion we can say, it should be also asked whether the evil at stake is a 
danger already begun, i.e., in action, or one that is about to arise eventually.  In one case it 
would mean redirecting its force to another, less important target, while in the other one it 
would stand for committing voluntarily a, so to say, preventive evil.  Further, another important 
question is whether the evil that is being agreed upon for good reasons is something that 
concerns the very agent (as in the case of legitimate defense) or if it is an option/right/duty for 
a bystander as well.  Can humans commit a lesser evil for another person, instead of her, or 
help her commit an allegedly lesser evil? As I have hinted several times, in my view, they can 
yet they must not.
　 From the modern authors, among those few who explicitly refer to the “principle” at stake, it 
is worth mentioning above all James T. Bretzke as its most lucid exponent.  He treats this topic 
in an article in the Jesuit review America from March 26, 2007,53 putting it in connection with 
the principle of double effect and other two “principles” that are, in his view, apt for resolving 
conflictual situations.  With this he caused a certain opposition, since according to some 
authors he is to be accused of proportionalism and consequentialism.  The problem lies above 
all in the fact that Bretzke interchanges a good end and intention which has evil as a by-product 
of such an objectively good action with deciding between two independent evil ef fects 
proceeding from separate actions.  Moreover, compared for example to the aforementioned 
Sgreccia54, Bretzke does not particularly distinguish between dealing with a physical or a moral 
evil; he almost suggests that they are to be treated equally.  However, he rightly points out that 
even choosing an evil in an inevitable situation for right purpose does never make of it a good. 
51 See fn. 15 in Part 1.
52 It is almost as paradoxical as punishing murderers for having taken away a sacred life by taking away their life. Wanting 
to make them feel the same suffering (which, in any case, is never sure) and so atone for their crime is definitely not 
the only and sufficient condition for justifying the death penalty. It rather disqualifies the victim from feeling a victim 
anymore.
53 J. T. BRETZKE, “The Lesser Evil,” America: The National Catholic Review, http://www.americamagazine.org/issue/608/
article/lesser-evil (accessed 17 August 2017; pp. 16―18 in the printed version); cf. ID., Handbook of Roman Catholic 
Moral Terms, Georgetown University Press: Washington D.C., 2013. There he is quoting a certain A. Browne (Anthony 
instead of Andrew!), who in 1938 is supposed to have sustained that a Christian can legitimately choose a minor moral 
evil in order to escape a greater sin.
54 See fn. 34 in Part 1.
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An example of this “principle” is for Bretzke “counseling the use of clean needles among drug 
addicts” or counseling “a person with H.I.V./AIDS who would not likely abstain from sexual 
relations to do everything else to protect the health (and the life) of his or her non-infected 
partner, including the use of condoms,” both of which do not imply directly endorsing that way 
of behavior.  In other words, such a behavior would clearly not be advisable under normal 
conditions, but the problematic question is whether a potential evil (avoiding which is 
considered a virtual good) can become a criterion for choosing an actual, real evil.  In the case 
of actual evils, it can be also looked upon not as agreeing with lesser evils, but simply as a way 
of reducing the evil result that is about to come.  Further, he cites Evangelium vitae §73 
stating that an elected official can support a moderate pro-abortion law as an alternative against 
a more liberal law and as an ad interim step to abrogating it completely one day if there will be 
a chance to do so.  But it would be a grave misunderstanding of this statement to interpret it as 
if it were saying that an elected official personally disagreeing with abortion laws can also 
personally practice or advise abortions just because they are still in consonance with a 
moderate version of the respective law and thus less dangerous than the practice of clandestine 
abortions.55 Once again, it is not clear if for Bretzke “tolerating” or “enduring” an evil, 
“participating” in an evil of others, “choosing actively” an evil, and “agreeing” with a lesser evil 
in order to avoid a positive greater one are all the same thing.  In our view, they are clearly not, 
and it seems that he uses them quite indiscriminately.
　 Just for the sake of completeness, let us add another author who mentions and analyzes this 
“principle” from an evangelical point of view, going even so far as to try to anchor it in Scripture. 
According to him,
here [in 2 Chronicles 30], if anywhere in the Scripture, is clear teaching that the spirit is more important 
than the letter, and that it can be a lesser evil to do something irregularly which God commands rather 
than not to do it at all.  Here, then, is clear biblical teaching on the doctrine of the lesser evil.  It was an evil 
not to have obeyed the letter of the law: hence Hezekiah had to pray for the people to be pardoned (v. 18), 
something which was hardly necessary if no evil had been involved.  But it would have been a greater evil 
not to have celebrated the Passover.  This, too, would have involved disobedience to a clear command of 
the LORD.56
55 Similarly, it would be a misinterpretation to explain the “law of graduality” (cf. Familiaris consortio, §34) as if any evil 
behavior was just a step towards some future perfection. Rather it should be said that the more or less evil actions are 
in some cases the only good possible for that person in his or her actual state. That means that evil is already actually 
there as a point of departure and the goal is to direct it towards diminishing until it disappears completely one day.
56 S. CLARK, “The doctrine of the Lesser Evil,” Foundations 59/1 (2008), 3―16 (http://www.affinity.org.uk/downloads/
foundations/Foundations%20Archive/59_03.pdf [accessed 17 August 2017]); emphasis added. It has been suggested in 
another context that if one were to look for examples of some kind of “lesser evil” reasoning and acting in the Bible, it 
would be much more reasonable to point to Ruben’s advice in Genesis 37 that the life of his brother Joseph be spared 
but that he be sold into slavery instead (v. 22). This would be clearly a case of redirecting an already begun action of 
which the agent is part.
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The main doubt that remains is whether solutions (if not responses) to everything can be found 
in the Scripture alone, may it be for justifying or refuting some action in the current behavior, 
without distinguishing narrative and juridical texts.  Anyway, the issue concerned here is 
clearly whether one omits fulfilling a duty (maybe because it is impossible to accomplish it as 
one should) or performs it at his or her best degree, although incompletely, and therefore it 
seems not to be argued in the Scripture at all that a person may freely commit one sin in order 
to avoid another greater sin.  The logic of obeying a (ceremonial!) precept, although 
imperfectly, rather than disobeying it does not show any problems in itself, but also cannot be 
applied to doing any action just in order to comply with an order ― divine or human.  That 
would be a dangerous interpretation, because lawgivers cannot and do not foresee every future 
situation and in some cases it can be lawful not to obey the law.  The importance of a ritual 
celebration, in this supposedly model case, can justify neglecting some rules that cannot be 
kept at the moment, but does not require performing it in whatever manner.  Not celebrating a 
Mass, whenever physically impossible, is clearly better than celebrating it unworthily and, 
mutatis mutandis, the great value of the Mass does not substitute for its basic presuppositions 
such bread and wine as well as dignified behavior.  Not fulfilling a duty is an omission, whereas 
breaking the prescriptions is an active commission.  Therefore, Clark’s obscure example does 
not show at all that the Scripture is universally teaching a “lesser evil” reasoning.
　 Letting one evil happen instead of another one, by not preventing it, can perhaps be a 
virtuous duty in certain circumstances, but actively choosing a lesser evil cannot and will not 
be called a good act just because of that.  What is it then? It is opportune instead to introduce 
another attitude, expressed by a different verb besides choosing and permitting: to tolerate (as 
it is the case in the Parable of the wheat and the tares in Mt 13, suggested also by Bretzke), 
which implies a clear disagreeing but at the same time waiting for the right moment to act.  As 
it is in the case of situations resolved by the “principle of double effect,” there might be an 
indirect, evil outcome of an action that is not intended but only foreseen, and as such at most 
tolerated.  The ruling principle in such a case is that a foreseen tolerated evil must be in some 
(but not every) sense lesser or at least equal in comparison to the good effect, i.e., the one 
directly aimed at.  It is only in this case that we can agree upon letting happen a “lesser evil” 
caused by the same good action ― lesser compared to the effect that would result from not 
doing anything.  The goodness of an action should actually consist not in evils avoided but in 
the greatness of goods achieved.  Therefore, it seems right to conclude that the guiding 
principle for human acting should be rather choosing greater goods, in some situations the 
greatest one, in another the only good possible,57 but not preferring lesser evils that would just 
57 On this point, see the next paragraph, fn. 64. However, it could be rightly asked ― in a bonhoefferian manner ― whether 
one can really know beforehand if the evil to be agreed upon as the least one is really such. On the one hand, in this 
imperfect condition of existence we are always running the risk of committing some evil ― more or less intentionally ―
but, on the other hand, because of our limited knowledge many evils that we are willing to compromise with might be in 
the end much serious ones that presupposed. Moral conduct does not depend on calculation between good(s) and evil(s) 
but rather on inclining towards the good and its realization. One could even say that the human person is not destined to 
“know” about what is a greater good and which evil is lesser but to do spontaneously only what is good in every situation.
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illusorily comfort our consciences by assuring us that at least we escaped worse results if 
anything.  In the case of goods to be chosen among, not every good is sufficient for being 
pursued: if there is a greater one, one has sometimes to sacrifice the lesser goods as well ― but 
this is not always the case, since even less good actions can be sometimes preferable or 
sufficient.  However, to apply this logic on the situation of choosing between evils is not more 
than a mere analogy.  In other words, arguing that something is less harmful that something 
else is not as sufficient for acting as to say that something is good or better than something 
else.  To say that there is a reason for allowing some evils does not mean that the same logic 
works for every evil action in general.  The proportionality is not at all even: diminishing the 
evil effect of an action is a duty (and not diminishing it might or might not bring a guilt), while 
choosing the greatest good is a task (therefore, failing to pursue it is not always blameworthy) 
and sometimes one has to be provisionally satisfied with a good of some degree instead of the 
maximal good not immediately achievable.58
4. A way towards a more adequate interpretation
　 This point we have just seen is another doubt resulting from the lesser-evil-reasoning.  If it is 
true that the axiom “lesser evil is to be chosen, if or whenever necessary” is not absolutely 
valid without restrictions, can then the same thing be asked about the good, i.e., from the two 
goods is the greater one always to be chosen at any cost? In my opinion, the greater good 
represents perfection, that is why it is desirable that it be chosen and pursued, but we cannot 
simply call it a duty for everybody.  For an everyday ethics it could be enough if any good is 
done, but always with an open horizon moving closer towards perfection.  But to say that an 
intentional evil is a step toward future good would be a plain contradiction.  In addition, as 
Sgreccia has put it,59 something similar can be said about choosing between two physical evils: 
normally we are supposed to reduce the evil effect of an event that is not preventable, but for a 
rational reason, i.e., for a higher spiritual value, there are cases in which people are allowed to 
prefer a greater physical evil before a lesser one, supposed their own person is concerned and 
that no moral evil, i.e. formal sin, is implied.60 Put dif ferently, if one really has to choose 
58 A different view is presented by P. SINGER, who regards any possible good always a duty (cf. “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality,” in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, Nr. 3 (Spring, 1972), 229―243 [especially 231]). Thus, not helping a 
stranger, for whose suffering we are not responsible and for which she is maybe even responsible herself, if it does not 
cost us anything, is in his opinion a moral failure. In his own words, “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” This 
duty to prevent every evil in ordinary circumstances is something uncommon in traditional ethics. Paradoxically, 
however, not helping some others who either for various reasons are not worthy of it or help which would cost the 
agent too much, is for him not always such a duty (as in the case of euthanasia or infanticide).
59 Op. cit.
60 In this context it is interesting to notice in detail what Humanae vitae (1968) says on this behalf. “Though it is true that 
sometimes it is lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil or in order to promote a greater 
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between various duties, those of natural law and precepts of the divine law have clear 
precedence over human precepts (ecclesiastical precepts included).  Of course, one has to have 
a sufficient degree of certitude on what is a higher precept and which good is greater, as well 
as a satisfactory reason for abandoning a possible greater good.  But refraining from acting, 
even though unwillingly, is not always a bad option either.
　 The idea is simple, yet it seemed to me important to emphasize the distinction.  Logically, to 
pursue the greatest possible good (at the expenses of letting some evil happen) and to accept 
some lesser evil for the sake of a good are not necessarily the same thing.  It should be the goal 
of moral education to learn not to satisfy oneself only with not doing any evil, nor with avoiding 
greater evils ― which are often just hypothetic ones ― but to strive for greater and more 
precious goods for which the agent is directly responsible.61 The reason is that not rarely 
humans set the standards for themselves too low, judging one’s actions in comparison to other 
possible but worse solutions so that their own decision comes to look as if it were a relatively 
good one.  This is rightly recognized and admitted as a risk of so-called “principle” of the lesser 
evil also by Bretzke himself: “The chief among them [i.e. moral risks involved in it] may be the 
temptation to think up some evil that would be ‘greater’ and then argue that one is somehow 
justified in preforming the [alleged] ‘lesser’ evil”.62 It is important to emphasize that people are 
actually capable of doing good actions even in the present corrupt state, before the complete 
coming of the Kingdom of God in its full manifestation.  On the other hand, categorizing evils 
in serious and more serious grades does cer tainly retain cer tain validity.  Without 
distinguishing greater and lesser evils, one could fall into temptation of thinking: “if all 
alternatives are evil, it does not really matter which one I choose” or “if I cannot avoid sinning 
completely, then it does not matter at all whether I commit the act once or more times.” 
However, these are only examples of false moral reasoning.  The inability to pursue the ideal 
solution does not mean that all the less perfect solutions become equally eligible.
good, ‘it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it’” (§14, emphasis added). The 
point is probably that even moral evils ― unless they are intrinsically wrong ― can be allowed, i.e. not prevented. 
Further, the Vatican instruction Donum vitae (1987) states clearly that “The task of the civil law is to ensure the 
common good of people through the recognition of and the defense of fundamental rights and through the promotion 
of peace and of public morality. In no sphere of life can the civil law take the place of conscience or dictate norms 
concerning things which are outside its competence. It must sometimes tolerate, for the sake of public order, things which 
it cannot forbid without a greater evil resulting. However, the inalienable rights of the person must be recognized and 
respected by civil society and the political authority” (section III; emphasis added). There we can again see the 
difference between “not prohibiting” and actively “allowing,” always in a public sphere rather than in the area of 
personal morality.
61 Starting from dealing with the evil by reducing it seems an easier thing to do, yet in our fallen state we probably know 
that it is likely that many people will lose their vigor just by spending it on the fight with evil and will be unable to 
proceed in engaging performance of the good.
62 Loc. cit.
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　 One question still stays open: How should we measure the evils63 ― either physical or moral? 
This doubt is similar to the dilemma of how to evaluate the greatness of lives to choose 
between.  Is it preferable to choose the life of the mother rather that of the nasciturus only 
because she has other duties to fulfill in life (e.g., to care for one’s own family) or because she 
can still give birth to many other children thereafter? In spite of the complexity of such a 
situation, from the personalist point of view, it seems that it cannot be said one life is greater or 
worthier than another simply because of its implicit relationships or capacities.  The to-be-born 
child has immanent possibilities as well; one could equally ask whether he or she will not 
become a great scientist or musician, if given birth to.  Similarly, it might be that the woman 
will not give birth to any other child (maybe exactly as a direct consequence of the abortion). 
Therefore, the first and greatest “duty” that remains clear for the physician is to save ― or at 
least to try to save ― both lives as far as possible.  A completely other case is when the doctor 
prioritizes the life of the mother that he or she tries to take care of by protecting her from a real 
threat, as in the case of curing an actual disease which requires suppressing the nascent life. 
But if really only one of both can survive, the choices of “mother’s life over child’s” and “child’s 
life over mother’s” are to be considered indeed equal ― i.e. theoretically, if both of them have 
the same probability to survive, which is rarely the case now more than ever.  In most of these 
dilemmatic cases, indeed, there is only one life that is actually savable ― that of the mother ―
without which the fetus cannot continue to maturate either.64
　 To tolerate an evil, as God does, in order to prevent a real and greater sin is a provisional 
arrangement progressively aimed at perfection, but it does not mean endorsing that evil or 
considering it relatively good.  Put differently, to allow and use certain evils to bring about a 
final good is maybe God’s way of acting, but to perform evil deeds in order to cause some good 
can be at most called “playing God,” and maybe it is even something worse since even God does 
never cause evil intentionally.  It may sound like a language game, but nevertheless “avoiding a 
greater evil” and “choosing the greater/greatest good” are, in my view, not quite the same thing, 
nor the two sides of the same coin.65 The condition for acting is that in the particular situation 
63 As already mentioned, if the lesser evil-ness meant nothing but, say, risk or danger or pain (lack of pleasure), it would 
be technically possible to rank actions according to their wrongness. However, in the Christian vision there are actions 
that are not dangerous or painful but can be evil, as well as actions that inhere a risk or damage but can be nonetheless 
good.
64 Cf. M. FAGGIONI, “Il male minore e il bene possibile,” Vivens homo 26 (2015), 127―149; here in fact the author refers to 
an earlier paper “Problemi morali nel trattamento della preeclampsia e della corioamnionite,” Medicina e morale 3 
(2008), 483―526 where he considers the possibility of sacrificing the fetus attacked by mother’s disease such as pre-
eclampsia or chorioamnionitis, in order to save the only life that is savable. In this sense, the pre-term birth of a non-
viable child causing his or her death (not preventable anyway) would not be so much a lesser evil, but rather the life of 
the mother would be the only possible good to pursue in this situation ― unless one wanted to lose both. In other 
words, it is not at all an issue of choosing only one between the two lives.
65 The reason for that is that the relation between good and evil is asymmetrical. As a result, to say that some goods can 
or have to be obtained at the cost of a bad means (for example, in the case of an amputation) does not imply per se that 
any evil means can be used for higher or better reasons (i.e., that any maiming can by in principle justified). Therefore, 
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there is at least some good to pursue, not only a relatively good (i.e. not evil) choice, whereas 
avoiding an evil is not good in itself and even a possibility of inviting an evil result without any 
sufficiently justifying reason is sufficient for refraining from acting as such.  This is, however, 
not to say that consequences or quantitative circumstances do not count at all.  Sacrificing five 
members of the crew of a submarine who remained outside in order to save an equal number of 
people who defend themselves from sinking and drowning might be said reasonable and 
morally licit, but the same cannot be said if only one person was staying inside ― even though 
she has right to self-protection too.  Fortunately, these kinds of conflictual situations are often 
not more than thought experiments and rare in real life, which means that considering adopting 
a less evil solution is and should be always rather exceptional and not paradigmatic.  If my 
analysis is correct, the reasoning of “reducing harms” does not apply so much to personal acts, 
even though people do unwillingly commit harmful yet excusable actions, i.e., it does not refer 
to sinfulness, but rather it is useful for policy-making of the societal whole, where most actions 
are premeditated and it is also much more obvious what the intention of the representative-
agent is directed towards.  Differently from that, the personal moral life is and should be more 
than just balancing between pros and cons, calculating between risks and benefits, more than 
just avoiding greater evils or justifying them with other proportionate goods.  It is a life guided 
by prudence that, despite failures, pursues those goods that the agent is meant to achieve.
　 Therefore, evil cannot be tolerated only because it is small ― indeed, the more perfect one 
wants to be, the more he or she cares about small defects, especially one’s own.  God calls 
everybody to responsibility only for deeds that were not necessary, i.e., that were really 
avoidable.  The question is how many situations there are, in which we actually face only two 
alternatives, both of which are evil ― one greater, one lesser.  I would say that often there are 
other hidden solutions too.  If they were, on the other hand, really both equally evil and both 
unavoidable, maybe it is better to roll the dice rather than to take on oneself the responsibility 
for choosing among them.  In everyday language there is a further language expression ―
“necessary evil” ― but is it that some evils are really necessary? In the present state, natural 
catastrophes are maybe something unpreventable, but can it be therefore said that for 
sufficiently good reasons a person can “close one’s eyes” implementing obviously evil means 
on the moral level too? I would say not.  For example, a scientist must never consider the 
suffering of people that accompanies his research and experiments aimed at finding a drug that 
would help much more people in the future to be a necessary evil.  From my point of view, the 
so-called necessary evils can be at most accepted, but never pursued as such, used as an 
excuse or participated in.  Furthermore, “necessary” often implies not only the unavoidability, 
but also the aspect of being “necessary (or useful) for” something, and in this sense ― in the 
Christian horizon ― evil cannot be agreed upon as something in some cases indispensable for 
achieving a good result.  It is of great importance to emphasize, that even if it could be said that 
some goods cannot be obtained without sacrificing some (lesser) evils, it would not imply that 
also omitting a good (maybe not any possible good, but that which can be done only by me) is in post-Vatican II 
theology rightly called a sin. However, I doubt whether by turning the same logic inside out it can be equally said that 
committing an evil only because it is “small” is a good and virtuous act.
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any evil proportionate to the good intended is automatically permissible.  In fact, as defined by 
one of the conditions of the so-called “double effect reasoning,” one ought to implement the 
least harm possible when inevitable.66 It is probably here that the logic of lesser evil finds its 
only application on the personal level: an evil (impossible to avoid when aiming at a greater 
good) can be allowed not only as an alternative to other still worse scenarios, but because 
lesser in comparison to the harm that would occur if nothing were done.67 On the other hand, a 
good ― however great ― that would be achievable only by illicit means (thus discrediting its own 
goodness) becomes questionable whether it is really a duty that cannot be foregone.
　 In any case, the important message for our culture and for the future generation is that evil 
is not something to be satisfied with or to make compromises as if it were part of our lives, our 
nature and our very essence.  Moreover, it needs to be stressed once again that, originally, evil 
was not supposed to exist at all, nor to be part of human nature, and the present transitory state 
is to be meant as penultimate and not definitive.  The fact that in everyday decisions it is 
difficult to avoid any evil and there are not any perfectly good choices does not mean that the 
endeavor to reduce evil in the world has no sense after all.  Especially (and only) in the case 
when some harm that depends on the agent herself is not avoidable, there should be an attempt 
at diminishing it, yet the suffering that does not depend on us remains part of our lives and 
retains also its sanctifying value that is certainly not to be forgotten.  In the beginning humans 
were not satisfied with spontaneously doing what was good (which was written in their nature) 
and wanted to “know good and evil,” e.g., to decide about it along with or instead of God, but 
instead they ended up being caught in the complexity of distinguishing between real and 
apparent, greater and lesser, physical and moral evils, which oftentimes they cannot resolve by 
themselves.  In the state of eschatological perfection anticipated already now, however, the 
human being is expected to know only the good, not about the good, and more precisely to 
know it together with God as God knows it.
66 On this principle, see: T. A. CAVANAUGH, Double-Effect Reasoning. Doing Good and Avoiding Evil, passim (see fn. 39 in the 
Part 1). Although the author does not address the topic of “lesser evil” explicitly, it seems it is a feature embedded in 
the double-effect reasoning, but not a standalone principle. Even if some harm is permissible, it has to be as little as 
possible. The problematic part is the distinction between intention and foresight. “We ought deliberately and 
intentionally do [sic!] good and avoid evil. We ought to intend the good, that is, deliberately pursue it. When it comes to 
understanding our proper relation to evil, we ought, deliberately and intentionally, to avoid it. We ought to intend to 
avoid evil” (p. 144). But “one can intend to avoid evil and one can avoid intending evil” and, therefore, “not to intend to 
avoid evil is not necessarily wrong” (pp. 145―146).
67 We can imagine quite easily the scenario of choosing between two presidential candidates, one of whom is clearly a 
danger for democracy, safety and future of the country and for some reasons is likely to win, while the other has her 
flaws too. It could be argued that not doing anything only increases the chances to win for the first candidate, and 
therefore one could satisfy oneself with the second, not at all perfect candidate, as a better solution. Yet, the questions 
that have to be dealt with are: are there really only these two alternatives, is it in my direct responsibility to choose in 
this matter, is the likelihood to win of the second candidate big enough as to contribute to it, isn’t the worse-ness of the 
candidate(s) only a matter of my personal taste, etc. Anyway, the principle seems applicable here because the choice 
which is being made concerns at least alternatives on the same level and it is the same agent who is choosing.
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Conclusion
　 We have seen that the word evil has come to be used in various connotations.  My claim is 
that all of these ― radical evil, banal evil, pre-moral evil, necessary evil and lesser evil ― talk 
about evil in an analogical fashion.  Unfortunately, due to the imperfect human condition, evil is 
actually part of many of our everyday choices, but that does not mean per se that evil can under 
certain conditions be a valid object of decision equivalent to choosing a good.  Every evil is 
rather a counterfeit of good and the task of every humane ethics is to tolerate as little evil as 
possible before eradicating it completely.  Two affirmations stand in a dialectical relation, both 
of them inevitable: none of us can realistically achieve all possible good, and in order not to 
omit an obligatory good we have to risk letting some possible evils happen; at the same time, it 
can be asked whether it is not our duty to renounce pursuing a positive higher good in some 
circumstances, so that some evil connected to it may be avoided.  This tension is probably 
inevitable and cannot be resolved theoretically in a satisfying manner.
　 It is true that the lesser-evil reasoning is a kind of common-sense argumentation, although 
not every intuitive reasoning is per se valid nor has a force of proof.68 It would be dangerous to 
consider all evil alternatives equal (free to choose among) only because they all are to some 
extent evil.  On the contrary, this “principle” tries to make sure that humans have to keep 
trying to reduce evil in the world, which is not possible completely nor right away.  While it 
remains valid that evil should not be chosen intentionally because it lacks the quality of a 
positive goal, in some cases an evil action is tolerated and pursued only in view of another, 
greater evil that is to be avoided.  Only in this pattern evil can be made something analogous to 
the object of a practical choice.  Anyway, for a greater perfection of those who try to live 
morally, it has to be highlighted again and again that even not choosing an evil (greater or 
lesser) at all does not automatically mean acting well, but it is usually a safer alternative.  In 
fact, one is not forced to do something in every situation and not doing anything does not have 
to be wrong, even if a (non-culpable) evil arises from that situation.
　 On the other hand, this reasoning implies the quite dangerous possibility of being 
interpreted very broadly and, as a consequence, almost any situation of perplexity could be 
judged according to this “principle” without making necessary distinctions.  In fact, there is a 
vast number of cases that are usually mentioned in order to justify this kind of logic.  In order 
to summarize what has been said until now, let me list up such exemplary cases or dilemmas, 
with which we came across and many of which still remain disputable:
a.  prescribing contraception although unwillingly vs. the risk of having to face abortion in the future as 
discussed by Sgreccia ― in this case the two evils concerned are not equal, one is actual and imminent, 
68 Needless to say, as humans we are and we will be performing actions of which we know they lack goodness. The 
crucial difference is not to excuse ourselves or justify those actions only because we couldn’t act otherwise. Many of 
the wrong deeds we do are done not because they are evil (lesser or otherwise) but despite their being evil, for which 
repentance rather than indulgence is required.
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while the other is hypothetical albeit probable, and therefore not to be used as an excuse for committing 
the former, although performing abortion is definitely a much greater evil than “just” opposing 
conception; 69
b.  planning to murder somebody out of anger/revenge vs. changing the idea to destroy some of his 
property instead (an example given by Bretzke with slight modification) ― the action is still sinful but in 
some sense praiseworthy because it abandons the greater evil originally intended; the question is 
however if a person has a real duty to help her friend to destroy his enemy’s property just in order to 
prevent that friend from committing a greater evil (is it not rather his autonomous responsibility?);
c.  the question about the most ideal political system as seen in Aquinas ― the lesser evil reasoning is not 
and cannot be in any case a justification for a despotic tyranny, considered better than a chaotic anarchy, 
but expresses rather a practical wisdom verified in our days as well; in other words, to defeat injustice 
and defend democracy is indeed a high value in itself, but compared with the chaos that often follows 
the elimination of a dictator, tyranny can in some cases be considered an imperfect, transient, and less 
evil situation ― in any case, the imperfect state is being only tolerated for the time being;
d.  choosing to save one life by “sacrificing” other five lives vs. saving more lives at the cost of one life ― the 
problem of the so-called “trolley dilemma” is the measuring of the weight of lives; apart from a 
utilitarian reasoning, we cannot simply decide that choosing to lose one life is necessarily a lesser evil 
to be preferred over letting (numerically speaking) more lives die;
e.  saving the mother’s life when the fetus is not savable anymore vs. not removing the fetus thus losing 
lives of both ― according to Faggioni, in this case saving the mother’s life at the cost of sacrificing the 
fetus is the only possible good in this situation, rather than being a lesser evil; anyway, even in this case 
some effort should at least be made to save both lives, for example by attempting a pre-term birth 
despite low probability of success, rather than consoling oneself with the excuse that sacrificing the 
fetus has been a lesser and necessary evil.
　 Although it is not within the scope of this paper to analyze concrete cases, let us briefly have 
a look at other possible conflicts where the principle of lesser evil is likely to be invoked:
f.  attending a Sunday service vs. taking care of a sick child out of love thus breaking the Church’s 
commandment ― this classical example is rather clear, since the two obligations at stake are not of the 
same rank: attending a mass is a commandment of the Church, while acts of charity are a God-given 
and in a certain sense also a natural law precept, hence, they are incomparable;
g.  assenting to one bodily temptation as a prevention for avoiding some other, worse impurity or as a 
means of reducing the psychological pressure (which can be real) ― in this case one is choosing 
between two similar acts differing in degree but still separate, both of which have not yet begun and 
69 There have been also other traditions in moral theology, as is the case of Alphonsus of Liguori (1696―1787), that would 
underscore the autonomous yet responsible discernment and decision of the acting subject herself. In his pastoral 
orientation it seems that he would allow for the woman’s choice of contraception, if and only if she is perfectly sure that 
otherwise she will be forced to abortion afterwards. Hence, it is not so much a matter of preventing one evil with 
another one, but rather treating them almost as contemporaneous threats, with moral certainty that the second and 
objectively greater one will unavoidably happen, which is knowable only for the very agent in her conscience.
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therefore one can maybe foresee how the course of action is going to develop, but we can never have a 
mathematical certainty that if the subject does not commit the lesser evil he will surely fall into a worse 
sinfulness (e.g., consenting more or less freely to an act of masturbation in order to reduce the sexual 
desire tends to shut out any possibility that maybe this time the grace will be efficient, that God will find 
a way how to help the person, that a miracle will happen, etc.);
h.  breaking the promise of returning a gun to an upset friend vs. giving it back thus facilitating a murder ―
however, in such case not returning the friend’s property to his owner is not breaking a given promise, 
but another kind of action, i.e., protecting him from committing evil, by withholding from him for now 
an object that is justly to be returned to him as soon as possible;
i.  lying about the hidden friend’s place or revealing it thus giving him over to enemy ― traditional ethicists 
analyzed this case over and over, suggesting for example that one can refuse to answer the question 
directly, without being guilty even if the friend is discovered as a consequence of that; however, a 
straightforward lie as a “better” solution instead of non-culpably causing another’s death still remains 
excluded for many ethicists.70
　 From what has been said, it seems to me that this principle has at least two dif ferent 
meanings and possible applications.  First, it can mean or imply choosing between two 
alternatives both of which are undesirable but one of them is tolerable as a means for avoiding 
the damage of the other one.  Often a lesser evil is decided upon as a way to prevent the arising 
of a greater evil.  In this sense the interpretation is highly problematic.  There are two distinct 
actions that are being compared and, moreover, they are often not even simultaneous ― one 
comes before the other one.  Second, the expression “lesser evil” can mean trying to reduce the 
negative potential of an action already begun, mostly of one’s own action, by directing it to 
another object.  An example would be re-directing the car moving towards a group of children in 
another way, maybe at the expense of losing one’s own life ― not because less worthy.  Such an 
action is usually instinctive and if there is no way to re-direct the car other than accidentally 
hitting a third person, the agent could not be inculpated because it does not really constitute a 
free intentional act and there was no real possibility of not doing anything that would result as 
good ― supposing one was driving according to the common rules.  In this latter sense, the 
principle has a sense, especially in alleviating the guilty feeling of the person involved and in 
helping her to do at least some “better” things where the most desirable good cannot be pursued.
70 Cf. J. SKALKO, Disordered Actions. A Moral Analysis of Lying and Homosexual Activity, Editiones scholasticae: 
Neunkirchen-Seelscheid, 2019, 303―304. Treating the topic of lying, Aquinas raises the objection whether it can be 
considered a “lesser evil” in some cases, for example, in cases of saving someone’s life. His answer is resolutely 
negative because certain actions are so disordered and inherently flawed ― to use the term of Skalko ― that they cannot 
be justified by a proportionately good reason (Summa theologiae, II―II, q. 110, a. 3 ad 4). To put it differently, life is not 
the only nor the highest value and lives should not be saved at any cost. On the other hand, fortunately, most situations 
do not offer only two options ― lying or telling the whole truth ― and we are given other possibilities how to save lives 
which can and should be saved in those circumstances. A different matter is, for Aquinas, stealing which is still wrong 
in itself but admits exceptions, as for example in cases of extreme necessity. This logic, however, is not applicable to 
every wrongful action.
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　 I am convinced that accepting an objectively wrong action in the moral life is thinkable only 
as a transitory, provisional, imperfect state, that remains deplorable, but contains the hope of 
heading toward future perfection, as soon as it is really possible.  It was in this sense that 
Benedict XVI wrote that if a male prostitute cannot immediately quit his sinful way of life, it is 
better if he at least uses a condom in order not to endanger his ignorant partners.71 In this 
sense, a naïve interpretation of the lesser evil principle is contra-productive because it often 
serves only for justifying one’s wished-for acting, but it can be pedagogical when understood as 
an exhortation to reduce the potential of an actual wrongful action, if it is not possible to get rid 
of it right away.  Therefore, it is not only about choosing between two evil actions ― a bad one 
and a worse one ― but about diminishing the effects of the same sinful acting of one’s own. 
Considered in this way, even when choosing a sinful action (that subjectively would not 
inculpate the agents with any guilt) because lesser than another one, the object of choice is not 
the evil, but moreover a sort of good, i.e., that of abandoning evil that would be certainly done 
otherwise and moving toward a greater perfection.  Sinning less is certainly not a sufficient, 
but it is a necessary condition for becoming a good person.  One more time, the “principle” of 
lesser evil should in my opinion not be considered a basic guiding principle of eminently 
Christian ethics, because satisfying oneself with a solution that is less evil than the other one (or 
all other ones) reduces the morally complex situation to a choice between two evils and, 
psychologically, it also makes the agent blind to other possible options that could be sought 
and tempted.  As I have claimed throughout this paper, rather than to resolve personal 
dilemmatic situations, the logic of “reasonably tolerating an imminent evil” finds application 
mostly in social policy-making with the intent to reduce harm or avoid a greater danger for the 
societal whole.
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